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This paper analyzes the pricing and output decisions of a cooperative that purchases and processes
an agricultural raw product from both member and nonmember producers.  Because of the
complexity of the optimality conditions, simulation analysis is used to demonstrate solutions for











Figure 1: Alternative output levels of a cooperative
Xe
This paper analyzes the interactions of a marketing cooperative with nonmember producers
of agricultural raw products.  A cooperative is a business firm owned by the users of the firm’s
services (Buccola 1994, p. 431).  The net revenue of the cooperative is returned to the cooperative’s
members on the basis of their use.  This paper focuses on marketing cooperatives that assemble,
process, and sell farm products.  
Figure 1 illustrates the cooperative’s optimization problem (Buccola 1994, p. 438).  
A cooperative that controls members’ output reaches its optimal output at the point where the net
marginal revenue (NMR) intersects the members’ supply function S.  The price paid to the members
is P.  The difference between the price paid and the net average revenue (NAR) is the cooperative’s
surplus.  This surplus is returned to the members, raising the price received to the full price (FP).
Helmberger (1969) argues that the cooperative is unable to set output at the income-maximizing
level.  In this model, the patronage refund raises the price received by the members from P to FP,
which induces members to increase their output to level X1.  Through a dynamic adaptation process,
members’ output converges to the equilibrium level Xe, where NAR and S intersect.  From the2
perspective of member welfare this is the wrong signal because it results in overproduction and
lower total welfare.  Pareto optimality is reached at the output level X0 if the cooperative is a price
taker in the processed product market. 
Issues of interaction of the cooperative with the market have been addressed by LeVay and,
in greater detail, by Lopez and Spreen.  The Lopez-Spreen model proposes a solution to the question
of how much raw product the cooperative should trade with nonmembers.  The main result of this
model is that the members of the cooperative set their raw product quantity according to the market
raw product price.  If the market price equals the price defined by the intersection of the marginal
net revenue curve and the supply function of the members, the cooperative has no incentive to
interact with the open market.  If that price is below the equilibrium price, the cooperative should
buy from nonmembers.  If the market price exceeds the equilibrium, the cooperative should sell part
of its members’ raw product to the market.  Assumptions critical to these results are that the
cooperative pursues a single pricing strategy for all suppliers, the marginal surplus of the cooperative
is equal from all sources, and members receive the average net revenue product as compensation for
the raw product delivered.  
Our model makes different assumptions about the market.  We assume that the cooperative
sets different prices for members and nonmembers.  It may also set the processed product price.
Before discussing nonmember business, it is useful to review cooperative production and pricing
decisions using a simple model of a marketing cooperative.  In this model, the cooperative processes
and markets a single raw product purchased from members.  Although we use a set of specific
functions to derive numerical solutions, the derived results are generally applicable to any set of
well-behaved functions.  3
P  a  bQ a >0 ,b  0 (1)
C  c  dQ c >0 ,d >0 (2)
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Simple Cooperative Model
The price (P) the cooperative receives for the processed product is:
where Q is the quantity produced.  The total cost (C) of processing the raw product is:
For simplicity, each unit of raw product is assumed to yield one unit of processed product.
Alternative assumptions would complicate the analysis without enhancing the results.  
The raw product (R) supplied by members is a function of the price (N) offered by the
cooperative:
Thus the supply function for the raw product can be written:
Members are assumed to supply raw product at the level at which the price they receive equals the
marginal cost of production.  Thus equation (4) represents the marginal cost function.  The total cost
of production (F) can be expressed:4
  PQ  C  NR (6)
MNR  MIC (7)
where the constant of integration g is fixed cost, which is an arbitrary value.
We identify three different objectives a cooperative can pursue.  To illustrate these outcomes,
we calculate a numerical example.  The parameters used in the analysis are shown in Table 1.
1a. Cooperative Maximizes Profits
In the first case, the cooperative behaves like a profit-maximizing firm.  It takes only the
cooperative surplus into account.  The objective function of the cooperative is:
This function is maximized with respect to the raw product price.  The decision criterion to
determine the price paid to members is:
where MIC is the marginal input cost.  This cost is the sum of the marginal processing cost and the
marginal cost of purchasing the input from the members.  The numerical results are shown in Table
2.  The cooperative maximizes its profits, which are redistributed to the membership.  Members
receive a patronage refund of 4.85 in addition to the price of the raw product.  
1b. Cooperative Maximizes Joint Welfare
Enke introduced a consumer cooperative objective function, which was applied to marketing
cooperatives by Royer (1978, 1982) and argued by Ladd.  This objective function aggregates the
profits of the cooperative and its members into a joint objective function:5
L  PQ  C  F (8)
NMR  N (9)
The cooperative is assumed to have direct control over the raw product quantity members produce.
Therefore, we differentiate equation (8) with respect to the quantity of processed product, which
yields the following first-order condition:
or net marginal revenue equals raw product price.  In this case the cooperative acts like a fully
integrated firm.  The on-farm cost of the members are internalized.  Members receive 2.07 in
patronage refunds, raising the total price received by members to 13.07.  The cooperative has to
restrict members’ output to the optimal level, by disassociating the raw product price from the
patronage refunds.  Table 2 shows the optimal solution in the welfare maximizing case.
1c. Cooperative Maximizes Price Paid Members
Helmberger and Hoos, in their classic article, argued that a cooperative does not have direct
control over members’ output quantity.  Such a cooperative finds its equilibrium quantity where the
member supply function intersects the NAR function of the cooperative.  This type of  cooperative
does not have a distinct objective function.  Instead it processes whatever quantities of the raw
product members choose to deliver.  The price of the raw product is derived from the behavioral
condition, that members react to the sum of raw product price and patronage refund. Thus the price
paid to members is:6
N  PQ  C
R1
(10)
N  NAR (11)
R1  e  fN 1 e <0 ,f >0 (12)
R2  h  lN2 h <0 ,l >0 (13)
Equation (10) can alternatively be expressed as: 
This behavioral condition drives cooperative profit to zero.  No patronage refund is paid.
Members overproduce, compared to the previous case.  To illustrate this solution, we calculated a
numerical example given the parameter values presented in Table 1.  Table 2 shows these results.
Models of Cooperative with Nonmember Business
If the cooperative is assumed to purchase raw product from both members and nonmembers, the raw
product supply function represented by equation (3) is replaced by two equations:  
and 
where R1 and R2 respectively represent the quantity of raw product supplied by members and
nonmembers, and N1 and N2 are the prices offered members and nonmembers by the cooperative.7
  PQ  C  N1R1  N2R2 (14)
NMR  MFC1 (15)
NMR  MFC2 (16)
L  PQ  C  N2R2  F (17)
2a. Cooperative Maximizes Profits
In this case, the cooperative treats members and nonmembers alike.  The objective function
of the cooperative reflects this:
The cooperative maximizes its profits with respect to the two raw product prices.  It exercises its
monopsony power in the member and nonmember market.  The decision criteria to determine the
prices paid to the suppliers of the raw product are: 
and
Nonmembers receive only the raw product price.  Members receive the rents that the cooperative
earn as patronage refund.  They get an additional 11.14 in patronage refunds.  Table 2 shows the
numerical solution in this case.
2b. Cooperative Maximizes Joint Welfare
The objective function of the cooperative is:8
NMR  N1 (18)
NMR  MFC2 (19)
The cooperative has two control variables, N1 and N2.  The decision criteria are derived by
differentiating the objective function with respect to the two raw product prices that are offered to
members and nonmembers. This differentiation produces two first-order conditions.  From the
conditions placed on equations (12) and (13) we see that neither R1/N1 nor R2/N2  is assumed to
be zero.  Thus the first-order conditions can be written:
and
MFC2 represents the marginal factor cost of the raw product supplied by the nonmembers.  This is
equivalent to stating that for a maximum value of the objective function, the cooperative will
produce the quantity of the processed product at which the marginal net revenue equals the price that
it offers members for the raw product and the marginal factor cost of the raw product supplied by
nonmembers.
Equations (18) and (19) can be solved for the optimal values of the prices offered  members
and nonmembers given the relationships presented by equations (1), (2), (12), and (13) and the
values of the parameters.  The optimal solutions for the prices offered members and nonmembers
for the raw product are shown in Table 2.  Again, nonmembers receive only the raw product price,
while cooperative members get 5.91 per unit of raw product in addition to their price.  The
internalization of the on-farm cost of the members allows the cooperative to act like a partially9
N1 
PQ  C  R2N2
R1
(20)
NMR  MFC2 (21)
integrated firm.  Only nonmember output is restricted to the monopsony level, while members
produce at the competitive level.
2c. Cooperative Maximizes Price Paid to Members
The cooperative cannot maximize members welfare directly, because it does not control
members raw product output.  The nonmember business is used as an instrument to improve
members welfare.  The objective function cannot be maximized with respect to the member price.
The first-order condition represented by equation (15) is replaced by the behavioral constraint:
The member price N1 is no longer a decision variable as it can be defined as a function of the
parameters and N2.  The only control variable in this model is the nonmember price N2.
Differentiating the objective function with respect to the nonmember price gives the following first-
order condition.
Equation (21) states that the cooperative will set the nonmember price such that the net marginal
revenue from the total processed product equals the marginal factor cost of the nonmember raw
product.  The behavioral constraint and the first-order condition define the optimal behavior of a
cooperative that is unable to control members’ raw product quantity directly.  The solutions of our10
numerical example is shown in Table 2.  Cooperative profit is driven to zero.  No patronage refund
is distributed.  Members and nonmembers receive only their respective raw product prices.
Comparison of Solutions
In the simple cooperative model, members receive the highest per-unit payments for their raw
product if the cooperative maximizes only its profits.  Members receive 13.52 per-unit.  The
cooperative behaves like a monopsonist and restricts output to 467 units.  Even though per-unit
payments are high, total payments to members are the lowest, the cooperative only purchases the
monopsony quantity.  If the cooperative maximizes the joint welfare of the cooperative and its
members, total payments are maximized.  In this case, payments to members are 13.07 per unit of
the raw product.  Members deliver 700 units of the raw product. 
Cotterill and others have pointed out that this solution is unstable. If members expect to
receive a patronage refund, they will increase output according to the supply function until the raw
product price is equal to average net revenue and the patronage refund is zero.  In this case, where
the cooperative does not exercise any control over the quantity delivered by members, the per-unit
payments are the lowest and production volume is at its maximum.  The value of the cooperative
objective function is less because members overproduce, increasing on-farm production costs beyond
the incremental increase in net revenue.
A cooperative that purchases raw product from members and nonmembers and treats both
suppliers alike, is paying identical prices to both parties.  Such a cooperative employs the same
amount of raw product as a simple cooperative that is maximizing joint welfare, but at a higher cost.
Members produce only half of the total input and receive total per-unit payments of 18.64.  The11
monopsony rent that is extracted from the nonmembers is redistributed to members.  
If the cooperative sets member and nonmember prices to maximize joint profits of the
cooperative and its members, the members receive 15.51 per-unit of raw product.  The cooperative
sets the prices such that the member price N1, the marginal factor cost for nonmembers raw product
MFC2, and the net marginal revenue NMRC all equal 9.60.  According to the nonmember supply
function S2, marginal factor cost equals 9.60 at price N2 of 6.80.  The quantity produced by members
R1 is 560 units the nonmember quantity R2 is 280 units.  As the member welfare-maximizing
cooperative purchases raw product from nonmembers, it reduces the member output by 140 units,
compared to the simple cooperative model.  At the level of 560 units member output, the marginal
factor cost of the nonmember production is equal to the member price.  It is efficient to replace
member raw product by purchased product and extract monopsony profits.  Compared to the simple
model, the cooperative also increases the total output by 140 units, which decreases the final product
price.
If the cooperative cannot control the production of its members, they use the extra payments
from the nonmember business to increase their output further beyond the optimal level.  Most of the
extra profit from the nonmember business is eroded by inefficient additional member production.
When the cooperative purchases raw product from members and nonmembers, members produce
an additional 35 units and the cooperative purchases 169 units.  Members’ per-unit profit increases
only 0.18, compared to 3.14 in the member welfare maximizing case.1 L = PQ - C - N2R2 - F
2 ￿ = PQ - C - N1R1 - N2R2
3 TMP = PQ - C - N2R2
Table 1: Parameter Values
Parameter Symbol Value
Intercept of demand function for processed product a 20
Slope of demand function for processed product b -0.005
Fixed processing cost c 1000
Marginal processing cost d 2
Intercept of reciprocal of member product supply function e -400
Slope of reciprocal of member raw product supply function f 100
Member fixed on-farm cost g 0
Intercept of reciprocal of nonmember raw product supply function h -400
Slope of reciprocal of nonmember raw product supply function l 100
Table 2: Summary of optimal Solutions
Cases




Results 1a 1b 1c 2a 2b 2c
Price processed
product 17.67 16.50 15.72 16.50 15.80 14.70
Price member raw
product  8.67 11.00 12.55 7.50 9.60 12.91
Price nonmember
raw product 0 0 0 7.50 6.80 5.70
Member quantity  466.67 700 855 350.00 560.00 890.83
Nonmember quantity  0 0 0 350.00 280.00 169.72
Member welfare
1 3,355.56 3,900.00 3,658.52 4,512.50 4,880.00 3,967.91
Cooperative profit
2 2,267.67 1,450.00 0 3,900.00 3,312.00 0
Total member
payments
3 6,311.11 9,150.00 10,738.62 6,525.00 8,688.00 11,499.16
Average net revenue 13.52 13.07 12.55 13.07 12.61 11.75
Marginal net revenue 13.33 11.00 9.45 11.00 9.60 7.39References
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